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Abstract—Currently, there is no any effective security solution 
which can detect cyber-attacks against 5G networks where 
multitenancy and user mobility are some unique characteristics 
that impose significant challenges over such security solutions. 
This paper focuses on addressing a transversal detection system to 
be able to protect at the same time, infrastructures, tenants and 
5G users in both edge and core network segments of the 5G multi-
tenant infrastructures. A novel approach which significantly 
extends the capabilities of a commonly used IDS, to accurately 
identify attacking nodes in a 5G network, regardless of multiple 
network traffic encapsulations, has been proposed in this paper. 
The proposed approach is suitable to be deployed in almost all 5G 
network segments including the Mobile Edge Computing. Both 
architectural design and data models are described in this 
contribution. Empirical experiments have been carried out a 
realistic 5G multi-tenant infrastructures to intensively validate the 
design of the proposed approach regarding scalability and 
flexibility. 
 
Index Terms— DDoS Attack, Multi-tenant, 5G Network, 
Security, Intrusion Detection System 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ifth-generation (5G) networks target a variety of new use 
cases, such as ultra-high definition video, self-driving cars, 
smart cities (internet-of-things), and remote telesurgery, all of 
them with a variety of specific requirements such as reliable 
communications, high data rates and low latency [1]. The novel 
5G architecture should provide new capabilities not limited to 
voice and data but also for those new use cases mentioned and 
beyond. The natural movement towards the digitalisation of the 
society and the usage of 5G in critical applications like 
healthcare, transportation and industry has exacerbated the 
importance of the security of the underlying networks which 
empowers 5G. The Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance 
(consortium of over 80 mobile operators, vendors, and research 
institutes) explicitly highlighted the importance of security of 
5G network “enhanced performance is expected to be provided 
along with the capability to control a highly heterogeneous 
environment, and with the capability to, among others, ensure 
security and trust, identity, and privacy” [2].  
The protection of the network against any forms of cyber-
attacks is of paramount importance [3], as they can cripple 
critical services – the recent attacks to UK’s National Health 
Service [4] and telecommunication service provider [5] are 
clear evidence of this fact. During the last years, Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have made their mark. In 
2015, 50% of the companies surveyed by Kaspersky 
experienced some level of disruption due to a DDoS attack [6]. 
In 2016, the volume of DDoS attack traffic increased to around 
600Gps, according to the worldwide infrastructure security 
report (WISR) [7]. With technological advancement, cyber 
attacks are becoming sophisticated and elusive. Recently, a 
DDoS attack called Mirai leveraged insecure IoT services to 
trigger a massive DNS DDoS attack that affected Dyn [8]. Such 
attack caused major Internet platforms and services in Europe 
and US to be unavailable. Since DDoS attacks are becoming 
subtle, it is getting more and more difficult to detect them, and 
even more difficult to be mitigated [9]. In this sense, when 
designing 5G networks, architectural considerations should go 
together with security considerations. Likewise, security 
considerations are expected to influence architectural decisions. 
5G networks will increase both the capacity and speed, so it will 
increase the demand for traffic, consequently leading to more 
wide and intense security threats [10].  
In this context, softwarisation is a key innovation coming 
with the 5G architecture where the different architectural 
elements of the 5G architectures can be running in software to 
enhance the flexibility of the 5G architecture. This new 
paradigm allows network operators the use of cloud 
infrastructures and mobile edge computing reducing both 
capital and operational costs by sharing resources between 
different network operators. Software-defined networking 
(SDN) and virtualisation technologies provide to network 
operators the capabilities to flexibly manage their hardware 
allowing them to create different isolated overlay networks with 
security boundaries between them for effective and secure 
sharing of physical resources. This capability of creating 
different isolated overlay networks which are sharing the same 
networking devices to implements multi-tenancy security in 
cloud infrastructures is mainly achieved by employing different 
encapsulation protocols. Currently, Virtual Extensible Local 
Area Network (VxLAN) and Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) protocols are two widely used alternatives. VxLAN [11] 
provides an overlays Layer 2 network according to the OSI 
reference model; whereas, GRE [11] provides an overlay Layer 
3 network. Both make use of a tunnel identification which is 
used to identify the owner of the overlay network, allowing 
effective management and isolation of the traffic. Mobile 
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networks also make use of encapsulation protocols to allow fast 
user’s mobility between antennas [12]. 5G networks are not an 
exception, and as is considered an evolution of 4G Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) networks, the tunnelling protocol used for this 
purpose is expected to be the General Packet Radio Service 
(GPRS) Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) [13].  
 Fig. 1 shows a simplified representation of different network 
segments of a 5G network. Radio Access Network (RAN) is 
typically associated with the deployment of Antennas and 
Remote Radio Heads (RRH) on top of buildings. Mobile Edge 
Computing Network is typically associated to the last mile 
where traditional Cost-of-the-Sell (COST) computers are 
allocated to process data close to the final user and where 
architectural elements such as Base Band Units (BBUs) are 
allocated, especially when a Cloud-RAN deployment is carried 
out. Core Network is where all the centralised parts of the 5G 
infrastructure are deployed to get access to users to other 
networks.  
Fig. 2 represents a more detailed illustration of Fig. 1, where 
the reader can see the typically key architectural elements 
deployed in the core segment of the network. Authentication 
Server Function (AUSF) and User Data Management (UDM) 
are traditionally associated with Home Service Subscriber in 
4G networks. Access and Mobility Function (AMF) and 
Session Mobile Function (SMF) are usually associated to 
Mobile Management Entity (MME) in 4G networks; whereas, 
User Plane Forwarding (UPF) is traditionally associated to 
Service Gateway (SGW) in 4G networks. All of these 
aforementioned architectural elements will be allocated in this 
5G multi-tenant network segment. Also, the Multi-Domain 
Network segment is where the network operators are inter-
connected to other network operators. In case, the reader is 
interested in a complete description of each of the roles of the 
different architectural elements envisioned in the 5G 
architecture, in [14] Kim et. Al. provides a very comprehensive 
description. 
A typical 5G scenario is composed of tenants/operators 
sharing infrastructures where their traffic is completely 
isolated, and their respective 5G users are provided with 
mobility thanks to the encapsulation protocols. Fig. 2 presents 
such 5G scenario where there are physical resources that are 
shared by mean of the usage of a virtual layer and where the 
main architectural elements of the 5G architecture are depicted. 
When a User Equipment (UE) is connected to an antenna, 
which belongs to operator A, this user is identified in the 5G 
networks by their TEID (tunnel endpoint identification) of their 
associated GTP tunnels, being inserted by the BBU/UPF 
element in the data path. Also, some architectural elements of 
the 5G network are associated to a given tenant/operator, which 
is identified with its unique virtual ID (VNID) given by the 
VxLAN encapsulation, mainly being inserted/removed by the 
virtual switches as shown in the Fig. 2.  It means that each 
packet sent from one user to another user allocated in a different 
antenna must be encapsulated at least twice in the network 
segment between the edge and the core of the network. In a first 
stage VxLAN isolates the tenant traffic, and in a second stage, 
GTP provides user mobility. 
In this new 5G mobile edge infrastructure, there are several 
actors involved over the same infrastructure such as 
infrastructure owner/provider, different network operators 
/tenants sharing the usage of such infrastructure and different 
5G users subscribed to each of the network operators. 
A flow is defined as a set of packets or frames passing an 
observation point in the network during a certain time interval 
[15]. An example of this flow structure bypassing the 5G 
mobile edge network between edge and core is shown in Fig. 3 
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Fig. 1. 5G multi-tenant network segment 
Fig. 2. Abstract architecture of a 5G multi-tenant infrastructure. 
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Fig. 3 Double-encapsulated 5G frame between edge and core. 
 
A combination of Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDS) which could trigger alerts in case of an attack, together 
with other metrics related with the status of the network, such 
as packet loss and congestion, are traditionally used to detect 
DDoS attacks in 5G networks to provide efficient counter-
measures. Traditionally, NIDS tools have been classified into 
two paradigms [16], namely anomaly-based and signature-
based detection. The anomaly-based detection methods 
compare the network behaviour with a network behaviour 
model, already created. On the other hand, signature-based 
detection methods are based on matching of known attack 
signatures with the incoming patterns. Both have their 
advantages and disadvantages, but they share a clear limitation.  
Traditional signature-based NIDS such as Snort [17] and 
anomaly-based NIDS such as Bro [18], to name a few, are 
mainly designed to provide detection capabilities to traditional 
IP networks. Thus, they do not provide support to detect 
transversal overlay networks being encapsulated over such IP 
networks.  Snort provides essential support for both GRE and 
GTP overlay networks. However, GRE or GTP Snort’s pre-
processors must be considered to either detect attacks inside of 
such overlay networks or in the traditional IP traffic, but not 
both simultaneous. Thus, Snort lacks to provide transversal 
detection capabilities to protect both IP networks and 
encapsulated networks at same time. Also, only one of these 
encapsulations can be enabled at the same time, and to the best 
of our knowledge, no IDS support VxLAN encapsulation which 
is needed for the tenant-isolation of traffic allowing L2 overlay 
networks. Also, even the most advanced IDS published up to 
date does not provide any support for double encapsulated 
traffic (nested encapsulation) which is exactly the main 
requirement imposed by the 5G multi-tenant architectures.  
This lack of support for transversal detection and nested 
encapsulation makes traditional IDS tools unsuitable for the 
new network traffic patterns imposed by 5G architecture, and it 
has been the main motivation of this research work. With this 
novel capability, the NIDS should be able to detect 
simultaneously attacks being addressed over a 5G user, a tenant 
or the entire infrastructure. The main contribution of this paper 
is the first NIDS with transversal protection capabilities and 
support for nested overlay networks to detect attacks against the 
mobile edge 5G multi-tenant network. The architecture 
presented in this contribution provides a significant set of 
innovations:  
• The extension of the traditional alerts information that 
used to provide only information about the IP traffic to 
provide now more metadata information about the 
flow structure involved in the attack, including tenant 
and subscriber identification information. It allows the 
system to provide metadata about the network to 
accurately identify the origin of the attack to be able to 
react very selectively against such attack without 
affecting other traffic within the same network 
segment.  
• The extension of a well-known NIDS, such as Snort, 
to be able to provide transversal detection capabilities 
to protect simultaneously, the 5G users, the tenant 
infrastructure, and the infrastructure provider.  
• To allow the dynamic creation of overlays network 
while maintaining the detection over such newly 
created networks. The proposed system is not 
restrained by several encapsulations applied to 5G 
traffic and support any nested encapsulation. 
• To allow a flexible allocation of the protection system. 
The proposed NIDS can be now deployed in almost all 
5G network segments including the Mobile Edge 
Computing   segment (see point A in Fig. 1), Core 
segment and Multi-domain segments (see point B in 
Fig. 1), against traditional NIDS where they will not 
work efficiently in almost any of these network 
segments. Thus, it is a significant advantage for 
Mobile Edge Security.   
The proposed architecture has been empirically validated. 
Different experiments have been carried out to test the 
scalability of the architecture. The influence of different 
network conditions on the performance of the system has also 
been analysed to prove the flexibility over several types and 
levels of encapsulations. Also, different attacks conditions have 
been analysed regarding attack bandwidth and packet rate. The 
extensive validation has shown very good scalability results 
allowing to provide the transversal detection capabilities in a 
5G multi-tenant network in less than 5 ms overhead of response 
time in average when compared against traditional NIDS 
solutions with no support for this type of detection.  
 The proposed architecture makes following significant 
contributions to Mobile Edge 5G Network security:  
• Diverse types of traffic tagging and encapsulation 
protocols are supported such as VxLAN, GTP, GRE 
and tagging protocols such as MPLS and VLAN 
allowing the usage of the NIDS in the edge and other 
network segments, unlike traditional NIDS solutions. 
• This approach accomplishes one of the most important 
requirements of 5G Network protection systems, 
which is being tenant-aware, but also 5G user-aware. 
The rest of the paper is organised as: Section II presents the 
related work with different approaches to network security 
problem in a 5G network. Section III describes the design and 
architecture of the proposed system. Section IV shows the 
extended data model used to provide the underlying network 
information. Section V presents the performance evaluation of 
the proposed system. Section VI concludes the paper along with 
future work. 
II. STATE OF THE ART 
Despite the considerable number of available NIDS tools, 
there is no NIDS which supports a complete transversal defence 
for mobile edge 5G multi-tenant networks. Mainly, because 
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conventional NIDS does not provide support for the nested 
encapsulation demanded in such kind of architectures. For 
instance, Snort IDS incorporates a GTP pre-processor, so in the 
presence of a packet with just GTP encapsulation, it can match 
rules with the inner information of the packet. It enables 
matches of gtp_version, gtp_type and gtp_info. However, it 
does not work with a double encapsulated packet. Then, on the 
edge of a 5G network, Snort will not be able to provide any 
further information against attacks on 5G users. On the other 
hand, Snort also supports GRE encapsulation so that it can 
match its rules with the inner information of the packet. 
However, as occurred with GTP it does not work with double 
encapsulated packets. Finally, Snort does not support VxLAN 
encapsulation. 
Novel defence mechanisms within a 5G network 
environment should consider the technological advancement of 
this new paradigm. There are three features mainly highlighted 
by the 5G PPP working group that would be included in those 
novel defence mechanisms [19]. First, multi-tenancy should be 
supported. Secondly, the novel mechanisms should be able to 
self-adapt to any change that could occur in the network 
topology. Moreover, lately, the overhead of the detection and 
mitigation system should not affect the overall performance of 
the network. A very small computation but also communication 
overhead should be added. Otherwise, the system would not be 
practical and scalable. Many works have been published 
addressing security threats in SDN, cloud computing and the 
more recent ones facing mobile edge 5G networks.  Li and 
Wang [20] recently proposed a cooperative defence (CODE) 
framework against DDoS attacks for mobile edge computing by 
using NFV and SDN architectures. In this work, the approach 
is to provide an elastic and efficient resource defence usage to 
avoid that some nodes with an IPS get overwhelmed and lose 
their defence capacity, by requesting other IPS nodes their spare 
resources. Vidal et. Al. [21] proposed a new strategy for 
detection and mitigation of DDoS flooding attacks towards a 
self-managed 5G network. Inspired by biological defences 
mechanisms of human beings combined with strategies for 
DDoS detection based on the study of variations of the entropy 
of the network traffic. The traffic used for the validation process 
is created with hping3 tool, using different protocols and 
considering different network topologies. The traffic used in 
this work is pure IP, and the topology changes considered in the 
study are based on link distribution per node and number of 
nodes, but there is any reference to overlay networks and 
multitenancy. Maimó et al. [22] have recently presented a deep-
learning based system to analyse network traffic by extracting 
features from network flows to identify cyber threats in 5G 
mobile networks. This solution is claimed to be self-adaptable 
to the volume of the network flows in real time. The validation 
of the solution is made with a well know dataset, the CTU 
dataset, which comprises scenarios with different numbers of 
infected computers and botnets families. Ros et al., [23] 
demonstrated an extensible IDS management architecture, 
where different IDS are installed in virtual machines, for 
different kinds of users and requirements in a cloud computing 
environment. It is claimed that the proposed management 
system could handle most of the VM-based IDSs. Pandeeswari 
and Kumar [24] proposed a novel IDS framework deployed at 
the VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor) in the cloud. It uses a 
fuzzy-cMean clustering mechanism with ANN (Artificial 
Neural Network) to learn attacks patterns to be detected in 
future. This framework is designed to be used in a network with 
a cloud topology that differs from a 5G network topology, 
where tenant isolation is not considered. Also, the dataset used 
for the experiments is a dataset of 1999 (DARPA’s KDD cup 
dataset) which does not contain any mobile edge, cloud or 5G 
traffic.  
Francois and Festor [25] proposed a tracebacking anomaly 
approach relying on OpenFlow switches. They defined a graph-
based model to identify potential paths of the anomaly, locating 
the entry points of a DDoS attack in the network, but the exact 
origin of the attack is not provided. They tested their solution 
with two concrete topologies; however, no details were 
provided about the efficacy of the system beyond those two 
topologies, and no overlay networks were considered in their 
study. 
Modi et al., [26] combined Snort and a decision tree classifier 
to detect known and unknown attacks. This solution is deployed 
behind virtual termination point to enable the detection of 
external and internal attacks. Although the system 
demonstrated good detection results, these results do not 
consider the possible encapsulation of the traffic – thus cannot 
be adopted for 5G networks to provide transversal security.   
Wamg et al., [27] proposed a DDoS attack mitigation 
solution for SDN-based cloud computing, called DaMask. It is 
divided into two separated modules, DaMask-D for detection 
and DaMask-M for mitigation. In the detection module, they 
embed Snort along with Snort.AD, an anomaly-based detection 
plugin for Snort. This solution can adapt to frequent topological 
changes of the network regarding Virtual Machines allocations. 
However, their solution is dependent on cloud providers. 
Besides, it is not defined where the suspicious traffic is hosted 
after being detected. Although authors are considering multi-
tenancy, their solution is not working with 5G traffic. Thus they 
are not considering every domain of a 5G network. 
Liang et. at., [28] proposed a solution based on an 
architecture with four layers: data layer, control layer, security 
layer, and application layer. Also, a local control agent is 
introduced on the switch to enable performing localised actions 
ordered by the control layer. The work proposed by Giotis et 
al., [29] use OpenFlow middleboxes to stop malicious flows of 
a DDoS attack in legacy networks. This work handle traffic on 
a per-flow level within an NFV context.  In this work, after a 
deep analysis of the challenges of the new SDN environment in 
the face of DDoS attack, a detection and mitigation system in 
the NFV context is proposed. A combination of anomaly-based 
detection and victim identification is used. However, this 
framework does not allow to identify the complete path of the 
attack within a 5G network.  
Shamsolmoali et al., [30] used a statistically based filtering 
system, first removing the header field of every incoming 
packet and checking its Time to Live (TTL) value, and then 
comparing its header with a database based on Jensen-Shanon 
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divergence. Within this approach, just the headers of IP traffic 
are compared, so it would not be effective for a 5G network 
environment.  
Liyanage et al., [31] proposed SIGMONA security 
architecture, a multi-tier security approach with four 
component: Secure Communication Component, Policy-Based 
Communication (PBC) Component, Security Management and 
Monitoring Component and Synchronized Network Security 
and Traffic Component. Within the PBC Component, there are 
included TCP-Splicing mechanisms with a bot detection 
scheme, for mitigating DDoS attacks targeted against the 
control plane. Although this work claims to secure 5G software 
defined mobile networks and both protect users and the network 
itself, it does not prove a complete transversal defence where 
both tenants and users are considered.  
Ding et. at., [32] proposed an approach to attack detection by 
recognising flow patterns. In this work, the information coming 
from Snort IDS is correlated with network flows obtained by 
aggregated packets. If one flow is not correlated with any alert, 
then is labelled as a benign activity. Otherwise, it is labelled as 
an attack. Those labelled flows are then used to develop several 
learning classifiers to classify unlabelled traffic. A similar 
approach to this work is being used in our contribution 
regarding header analysis; however, this work only covers IP 
traffic, and our work has been significantly extended to detect 
attacks in mobile edge 5G multi-tenant networks.  
Fan and Liu [33] use SVM (Support Vector Machines) and 
K-means to classify SDN traffic to address the new 5G 
networks paradigm. Ten types of traffic are considered, one of 
them is an attack.  A self-collected dataset is used in this work 
due to the lack of publicly available 5G traffic datasets. They 
describe all the features used for the classification related to 
flows. Within the information of the flows used as features for 
the classification, there is no information related to 
encapsulation; either regarding the 5G user or the tenant 
information. It means that the traceback of a real 5G double 
encapsulated traffic in case of an attack will not be possible with 
this solution despite their claims.  
A summary of all these previous works is shown in Table 1. 
In this table, the column IDS point out which type or types of 
IDS are used in the work if any. Column “F.A.”, flow-aware, 
indicates whether the traffic analysis is handled per flow or not, 
i.e. only at global traffic patterns. Column “U.A.”, indicates 
whether the system is user-aware or not, it means that if the 
detection system has any information regarding the user as an 
entry point of the attack. Likewise, the column “T.A.” indicates 
whether the system is tenant-aware or not, which means if the 
detection system has gathered any information regarding the 
tenant as an entry point of the attack. From Table 1, none of the 
related works presented has managed to accomplish flow-
aware, user-aware and tenant-aware, at the same time. None of 
them has considered nested encapsulation to be able to allocate 
their NIDS in the edge of the network. To the best of our 
knowledge, this contribution is the first one to be able to provide 
these capabilities simultaneously and to detect this kind of 
complex attacks in the edge of the 5G network due to the 
advanced transversal detection capabilities supported. 
 
 
TABLE I. RELATED WORKS 
Ref Description IDS F.A. U.A T.A N. E. 
[20] Cooperative defence framework 
against DDoS Attacks for 5G 
MEC leveraging NFV and SDN 
for effective use of the defence 
resource in each IPS. 
- - - - - 
[21] Artificial Immune Systems to 
mitigate DDoS attacks 
AI NO NO NO NO 
[22] Anomaly detection based on 
deep-learning for 5G networks 
AI YES NO NO NO 
[23] IDS architecture for distributed 
cloud infrastructures 
** NO NO NO NO 
[24] Anomaly detection system ate 
the hypervisor layer 
AI NO NO NO NO 
[25] Traceback of DDoS attack in 
SDN carried out in each switch 
where the attack has been 
detected. Need to know the 
topology. 
- YES NO NO NO 
[26] Detect anomalies between VMs Snort YES NO NO NO 
[27] Virtualization of the network to 
mitigate DDoS over three 
strategies for making the scheme 
effective, inexpensive and with 
small overhead. 
SB+A
B 
YES NO YES NO 
[28] 
 
 
 
SDNM mechanism to protect the 
control layer against DoS 
attacks. 
- NO NO NO NO 
[29] Control and filter of malicious 
traffic flows by deploying on-
demand VNFs 
AB YES NO NO NO 
[30] A statistical-based filtering 
system that compares packet 
header in a second stage of the 
filtering. 
AB NO NO NO NO 
[31] Architecture that manages to 
mitigate DoS and DDoS attacks 
thanks to the security gateways 
proposed that hide controller 
from the outside. 
- NO NO NO NO 
[32] Packet aggregation to obtain 
flows definition to be labelled 
based o Snort output and then 
being used in a classifier 
Snort 
+ ML 
YES NO NO NO 
[33] Two machine learning 
approaches for SDN traffic flow 
classifications 
ML YES NO NO NO 
 
Our contribution - Snort 
Monitoring Agent (SMA)  
Snort YES YES YES YES 
A.I= Artificial Intelligence , AB. = Anomaly Based Detection, SB Signature 
Based Detection, ** several IDS’s, - not indicated in the paper 
 F.A. = Flow Aware, U.A. = User Aware, T.A. = Tenant aware, N.E. = Nested 
Encapsulation 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
A novel approach is proposed to address the gap of defence 
mechanisms for mobile edge 5G multi-tenant infrastructure. 
Within this approach, a signature-based IDS is combined with 
a 5G traffic classifier to obtain the information to provide 
concrete and effective mitigation actions. This solution aims to 
be the first step towards a self-managed defence network 
system due to the extended metadata information provided as 
part of the detection of the attack. The architecture provided has 
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been coined as Snort Monitoring Agent (SMA) as it has been 
built as an agent extending Snort IDS capabilities.  
A. Architecture overview and proposal description 
 
Fig. 4 System design. 
The proposed system is composed of three main components, 
as shown in Fig. 4.  
1) NIDS Reports Reader (see 1 in Fig. 4) its role is to 
retrieve events and statistics coming from the NIDS1. A plug-in 
based approach has been designed to enable our architecture to 
work with different NIDS. Each of the plugins oversees 
detecting the proper execution of the NIDS and parsing its log 
file where NIDS is dumping all the information on the events 
that are detected. NIDS Report Reader takes the log file tailing 
any new event logged by NIDS in Unified2 format. Unified2 
[34] is a common output open format for network intrusion 
detection tools such as Snort, Suricata and Bro. Unified2 has 
been the chosen output format because it allows NIDS to 
operate faster and minimise the packet loss. Unified2 is also 
used by other tools such as Barnyard2 or Pigsty in production 
environments [35]. On the other side, the SMA reads the 
statistics report of NIDS with the same frequency that indicated 
in the NIDS configuration files.  
Fig. 5 shows the capture of a packet with nested VxLAN and 
GTP encapsulations. An alert triggered by this packet is like the 
one shown in Fig. 6. For this example such alert has been 
converted from binary with the tool provided with Snort 
sources, u2spewfoo. It is important to emphasise that the 
information provided by the current alert does not allow to 
perform the identification of the malicious flow of the 5G user. 
Instead, only provides information about the first IP header 
which encapsulated all the traffic of all the users of all the 
tenants and thus it does not provide enough accuracy to be able 
to produce an alert associated to a specific 5G user.  
                                                           
1 Although Snort was used in the validation process of the proposed solution, 
any IDS reporting in unified2 format could be used instead. The proposed 
system is independent of any specific IDS.  
 
Fig. 5. Example of a capture of a packet with double encapsulation. The 
extended fields show the VNI and TEID identifiers corresponding to a tenant 
and a user. 
 
Fig. 6. Example of a Snort alert triggered by the packet shown in Fig.5. This 
caption is an extract of a Snort log processed with the tool u2spewfoo. 
2) SMA Flow Classifier (see 2 in Fig. 4) its role is to extract 
all the required information from the flow. The flow headers are 
included in the Unified2 format, and thus a custom parser for 
all the encapsulations previously described has been 
implemented. All values are stored in network byte order, so all 
the information is parsed into the SMA data model (described 
in Section IV). After being parsed, a Deep Packet Inspector 
(DPI) Flow classifier extracts all the information needed in the 
reaction/mitigation stage about the flow layers involved in each 
of the existing overlay networks. In Fig. 7 it is depicted a brief 
scheme of the sequencing process carried out by this DPI Flow 
classifier for a UDP packet similar to the one shown in Fig. 5 
and for different levels of encapsulations. The IP Flow 
sequence (see 1 in Fig 7) shows the process followed for an IP 
flow with no encapsulation. The LTE Flow sequence 
corresponds with an LTE flow with GTP encapsulation (see 2 
in Fig 7), the Multi-Tenant Flow sequence would match a multi-
tenant flow with VxLAN encapsulation (see 3 in Fig 7) and the 
5G Multi-Tenant Flow sequence corresponds to the one 
followed by the DPI Flow classifier with a packet like the one 
shown in Fig. 5 where there is multi-tenant isolation in 5G 
infrastructures (see 4 in Fig 7). The DPI flow classifier includes 
the definition of different patterns to match different network 
protocols, at any level of the OSI model. 
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Fig. 7. Brief scheme of the parsing process of the DPI Flow Classifier for a UDP flow with different levels of encapsulations.  
 
The last sequence is the more complex one since it 
corresponds with a 5G multi-tenant flow like the one depicted 
in Fig. 5 which has nested encapsulation. Thus, the parsing 
process match all the headers shown in the Wireshark capture: 
Ethernet/ IP/ UDP/ VxLAN/ Ethernet/ IP/ UDP/ 
GTP/IP/UDP/HTTP.  
A sequence like this one is treated by Snort as traditional IP 
traffic (i.e. such us the first sequence) despite being a much 
complex flow. This fact is the reason why the information 
provided by the Snort alert depicted in Fig. 6 is only the one 
regarding the outer header. This lead to a lack of accuracy in 
the identification of the malicious 5G Flow and the 
enhancement of such accuracy is mainly provided by the novel 
classifier proposed.  
The use of the DPI Flow classifier makes it possible to find 
and classify specific data contained in the packet, beyond the 
outer header and regarding the flow. Thus, it is possible to get 
transversal information from all the overlay layers of the 
packet, including user IDs, Tenant IDs, IP addresses involved 
and ports. This approach is a data-driven classification so that 
all the information provided in the output, is the complete 
information related to a flow. This architectural element of the 
system design allows the transversal detection of attacks since 
it dissects any overlay network extracting all the metadata along 
the parsing path to keep all the metadata associated. This 
component also allows the detection of attacks in all the 
network segments of the 5G mobile edge architecture mainly 
due to the support for nested encapsulation and of all the 
protocols being used in the traffic patterns between edge and 
core.  
3) SMA Reporter (see 3 in Fig. 4) its role is to build JSON 
messages and report them. These messages are either new alerts 
or statistics. Within this JSON it is included information about 
the flows, about all the overlay networks, about the attack type 
detected, and other the place where the attack has been detected. 
The JSON of the alerts contains all the information related to 
the 5G multi-tenant traffic which generated the alert. The JSON 
of statistics is used as a set of metrics to extend the alert 
information and providing a further context in case of having to 
 
 
 
Listing 1. Example of a report sent by the SMA 
take a decision. When taking a flow as the basic unit, a typical 
countermeasure is to drop the malicious flow [36]. 
{"Alert": { 
  "alertType": "7", 
  "alertRuleId": "10000003", 
  "alertImpact": 2, 
  "alertTime": 1530028986945, 
  "reportedTime": 1530037043509 },  
 "Metadata": [{  
      "flowId": "48A07435", 
      "encapsulationLayer": 0, 
      "macSrc": "52:54:00:E3:95:AD", 
      "macDst": "52:54:00:A4:A7:95", 
      "srcIP": "10.10.12.100", 
      "dstIP": "10.10.12.200", 
      "l4Proto": "17", 
      "srcPort": "40880", 
      "dstPort": "4789", 
      "l7Proto": "vxlan" }, 
    {  
      "flowId": "90D8AC34", 
      "encapsulationLayer": 1, 
      "encapsulationID1": "0000285C", 
      "encapsulationType1": "vxlan", 
      "firstPacketSeen": 1530037043509, 
      "macSrc": "42:A5:CD:62:51:0D", 
      "macDst": "06:64:51:A1:59:42", 
      "l3Proto": "2048", 
      "srcIP": "192.12.0.1", 
      "dstIP": "192.12.0.2", 
      "outSrcIP": "10.10.12.100", 
      "outDstIP": "10.10.12.200", 
      "l4Proto": "17", 
      "srcPort": "2152", 
      "dstPort": "2152", 
      "l7Proto": "gtp-u"}, 
    { 
      "flowId": "5BF5DE57", 
      "encapsulationLayer": 2, 
      "encapsulationID2": "000084D1", 
      "encapsulationType2": "gtp", 
      "srcIP": "11.0.0.1", 
      "dstIP": "11.0.0.2", 
      "outSrcIP": "10.10.12.100", 
      "outDstIP": "10.10.12.200", 
      "l4Proto": "17", 
      "srcPort": "35534", 
      "dstPort": "80", 
      "l7Proto": "http" } ]} 
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Within a 5G multi-tenant network in the context of the 
communication between edge and core, it is important to be 
able to choose the proper action to mitigate the attack. For 
instance, 1) to drop all the traffic from a user, 2) to drop all the 
traffic from a tenant, 3) to drop just the malicious flows coming 
from a user; 4) to drop all the traffic coming to that interface; 5) 
to drop all the traffic coming to the physical computer. The 
metadata provided in the JSON format allows performing any 
of these diverse types of fine-gain dropping actions.  
An example of this JSON report is shown in Listing 1. In such 
report, it can be seen information that is already provided by 
Snort but also the extended information provided by the SMA 
metadata as a result of the new packet classification. Within this 
metadata, it can be found information about each of the 
encapsulation layers of the flow involved in the alert. In this 
example, an encapsulationLayer 0 provides information about 
the IP frame, an ecapsulationLayer 1 provides information 
about the VxLAN encapsulation, including the VNID identifier 
(Tenant identifier), and finally an encapsulationLayer 2 
provides information regarding the GTP encapsulation, 
including the TEID identifier (5G User identifier). This 
information allows uniquely identifying the flows of each of the 
mobile users of the different mobile infrastructures that are 
deployed in the different tenants deployed in the infrastructure. 
B.  Design principles and limitations 
To develop the proposed solution the following design 
principles have been followed: 
• Modular design. A low coupling modular design has 
been approached to make the solution open future 
extensions.  Thus, if a new alert format needs to be 
supported, a new extension of the NIDS Reports 
Reader module has to be added, without affecting the 
rest of the modules. The current version already 
supports different NIDS tools due to the use of 
unified2 as the first input format considered, used by 
Snort, Suricata and Bro. Likewise, new classifications 
could be added by just modifying the SMA Flow 
Classifier module. In the same way, if another reported 
method is required, just a new extension of the SMA 
Reporter has to be added.  
• Extensible data model. A common data model has 
been designed to be used by the three modules that 
compose the SMA. This transversal module has been 
designed following the Data Access Object (DAO) 
pattern, providing an abstract interface to the modules. 
If a module needs to be extended it just have to satisfy 
the public interface of the DAO so that it can interact 
with the rest of the modules.  
The limitations of the proposed solution are the following ones: 
• A NIDS tool has to be installed, configured and run to 
make the SMA working. Also, the SMA has to be 
configured accordingly. 
• Currently, the SMA only supports Unified2 alerts 
format. The NIDS Reports Reader module has to be 
extended to support another format. 
• Since the SMA has been designed as an extension of a 
NIDS tool, it inherits the limitations of this NIDS 
regarding performance. For example, any limitation of 
the NIDS regarding bandwidth, delay or resource 
consumption is inherited by the SMA software.  
• Some very specific communication protocols are not 
supported by the Flow Classifier yet. In this case, an 
extension of the Flow Classifier will be enough to 
satisfy the requirement of a new communication 
protocol, without having to modify the rest of the 
components or interfaces. 
IV. DATA MODEL 
Fig. 8 shows both Snort and the SMA data model regarding 
alerts. The output of Snort does not include any information 
about the encapsulation layers as pointed before and showed in 
Fig. 6. The data model defined in the SMA is using the same 
alert identifier and replicating some of the information provided 
by Snort and extending this information with the one obtained 
by the classifier about the packet. Among this information, it is 
worth to mention the “encapsulationID” for each overlay 
network. For instance, this field contains the TEID related to 
the GTP tunnel and the unique VNID of the VxLAN 
encapsulation protocol. The packet included in the alert will 
belong to a flow that identifies the origin of the attacker. This 
attacker is connected to an RRH that is connected to a BBU. In 
a scenario where all the UE users are infected by the Command 
& Control (CAC), we could get this same alert repeated for each 
user. The number of alerts per user will depend on the way rules 
have been configured, if these users are connected to different 
RRH and BBU’s and belong to different tenants. All this 
information is needed to trace back the alert to its source, and 
this information is provided by the SMA. Therefore, in an alert 
scenario, the defence/mitigation system connected to the SMA 
could trace back the origin entry points and the origin of the 
attack, which makes it possible to mitigate the attack through 
proper location, without affecting other users, tenants or 
infrastructures. 
 
However, only with the output provided by NIDS (Snort), it 
will be impossible to extract the information related to users or 
tenants. Thus, it will not be possible to enforced actions by a 
defence/mitigation system related to the dropping of this kind 
Fig. 8. a) Snort output data model ; b) SMA output data model 
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of overlay flows, being forced to drop all the traffic passing 
through the corresponding BBU from the same port of the alert.  
That means that every user connected to that BBU would lose 
connectivity and consequently its access to 5G services would 
be restrained. Thus, our system design provides a significant 
step forward by enabling the definition of very fine-grain 
mitigation rules for malicious traffic.  
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the use case prototyped for the empirical 
validation of the architecture is described in the next subsection. 
A well-known attack, UDP flooding attack, in a realistic 
scenario has been prototyped. Besides this, the testbed used in 
the validation process is also explained. Finally, the validation 
and scalability tests are presented with the obtained results.   
A. Use Case Addressed 
A User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding attack [37], by 
definition, is a DDoS attack that floods a target with UDP 
packets. The goal of the attack is to flood random ports on a 
remote host. This attack causes the host to check for the 
application listening on that port repeatedly and, when no 
application is found, reply with an ICMP ‘Destination 
Unreachable’ packet. This process weakens host resources, 
which can ultimately lead to inaccessibility of services. For 
empirical evaluation of the proposed system, UDP flooding 
attack within 5G multi-tenant networks has been chosen. For 
the simulation of a DDoS attack, Bonesi [38] has been used. 
Bonesi generates ICMP, UDP, and TCP flooding attacks from 
a given botnet size, by defining an IP range. In this case, the 
simulation has been made from just one IP address since the 
botnet is already represented by the number of UEs of our 
scenarios. Bonesi is configurable regarding rates and data 
volume. Therefore, Bonesi has been used to generate flooding 
traffic with different packet rates and payload size 
configurations. By combining both payload and packet rate, it 
is possible to obtain attacks of different bandwidth.  
In order to measure the scalability of the SMA, UDP payload 
size between 0 and 1368 has been used, and bandwidth between 
12.5 and 100 Mbps has been tested. Notice that this range of 
bandwidth is a very realistic one for a number of UE 
subscriptions in an LTE/5G network nowadays. Bonesi 
generates just IP traffic, so, to achieve 5G multi-tenant traffic, 
a real LTE/5G multi-tenant infrastructure deployed in our 
premises has been used to gather a PCAP file to be later used to 
scale up a DDoS attack. This infrastructure encapsulates the 
traffic from Bonesi using VxLAN for tenant isolation using 
OpenStack [39]. The tenant has inside a set of virtual machines 
using OpenAirInterface [40] that are used to allow the computer 
with Bonesi to connect to our LTE/5G antenna using an 
LTE/5G Dongle. Then, BBU encapsulated traffic in GTP to be 
sent to the SGW. Then, the traffic has been captured at the edge 
of the network to be able to intercept the communication 
between edge and core. Both encapsulations provide the 
infrastructure with tenant isolation and user mobility 
respectively, a key requirement for a 5G infrastructure. With 
the infrastructure available, different scripts of Bonesi has been 
executed to send traffic at different packet sizes and 
bandwidths. The sniffing of the PCAP has been performed at 
different physical and logical interfaces to be able to extract 
different encapsulation PCAPs. 
Thus, depending on an experiment, a different PCAP has 
been used as base PCAP, regarding packet rate, bandwidth and 
number of encapsulations. For a specific experiment, as many 
as PCAPs are generated by rewriting the base PCAP, as it is the 
number of attackers. Therefore, the source and destination IPs 
had to correspond to the ones defined for each attacker and 
victim. Also, MAC addresses have been modified to have a 
correct routing adapted to the scenario. Also, destination ports 
have been changed to simulate a UDP flooding attack as well 
as the VNID to simulate a multitenancy environment.  
B. Testbed 
In order to emulate different real 5G scenarios, the Common 
Open Research Emulator (CORE) [41] has been used to 
emulate a DDoS attack. CORE is an open-source tool that is 
widely used for both research and military purposes. In contrast 
with network simulators, CORE as an Infrastructure-as-a-
Service stack that allows the deployment of real x86-64 PC 
architectures using Linux containers and then creating virtual 
infrastructures by connected such containers within a network 
topology in real-time. CORE creates a Linux namespace for 
each of the emulated nodes to allow a complete container to act 
as a real node, creating a completely functional emulator. 
Different scenarios, like the one shown in Fig. 10 have been 
generated and executed, to test the scalability of the architecture 
presented herein. All the scenarios share a common deployment 
scheme which is a realistic 5G multi-tenant infrastructure. This 
deployment schema is shown in Fig. 9. The deployment scheme 
virtualises a 5G/LTE network; thus, it has considered mobility 
between antennas for users. From left to right in Fig. 9, the first 
nodes drawn are the mobile User Equipment (UE), which will 
act as the attacker(s).  
 
Fig. 9. A common scheme of the scenarios used for the experiments. 
There are always at least two attackers, which are mobile 
users connected to an RRH. The BBU is shared by different 
RRHs. After that, it comes the core network whose links are 
configured to have a 1Gbps bandwidth in every link. On the 
other side of the network, there are the victims of the attacks, 
represented as servers. All the traffic that passes through the 
network is mirrored to the SMA node, in the centre of Fig. 9 , 
to intercept and analyse the traffic between edge and core 
network segments. Thus, Snort is configuring to trigger an alert 
in case of an attack and then processed by the SMA.  
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Fig. 10. Screenshot of the CORE Emulator for one of the scenarios executed. 
 
This deployment scheme is replicated for different scenarios, 
varying the number of attackers, RRHs, BBUs, switches, and 
routers from the core network, the number of victims. Table II 
shows the ranges values for each of the scenarios executed.  
 
TABLE II. Scenarios executed 
VARIABLE min max Step 
Number of UEs per 
RRH 
1 16 Xn=Xn-1*2 
Number RRHs per 
BBUs 
1 4 Xn=Xn-1*2 
Number BBUs per 
switch 
1 4 Xn=Xn-1*2 
Number of switches 1 16 Xn=Xn-1*2 
Number of victims 1 128 Xn=Xn-1*2 
 
Fig. 10 shows an example of a 5G multi-tenant scenario used 
for the experiments, created with the CORE. In this case, a 
DDoS attack with 64 attackers and one victim has been 
emulated. The nodes that work as an attacker are mobile 
subscribers labelled as UE. The nodes that work as a victim are 
labelled as SERVER. A key requirement for 5G networks is the 
connected mobility [42]. Thus, UE nodes have mobility, so that 
they change between antennas, and therefore end up connected 
to different BBUs. All the traffic passing through the named 
nodes CEDGER, is mirrored to the SMA node using iptables 
rules, so all the traffic passing form attackers to victims can be 
sniffed from there.  
With all the different scenarios analysed, the aim is to test the 
flexibility of the SMA to topology changes as well as the 
scalability. At the same time, those different combinations 
allow testing different attacks regarding the number of victims, 
packet size, bandwidth, and packet rate. So, there could be 
attacks where every UE is attacking the same victim, or in the 
other extreme, each UE is attacking a different victim.  The 
scenarios have been executed in an Intel Core i7 CPU 4.20 
GHz, 32GB RAM hosting a Virtual machine with 16GB RAM 
and 4 cores. The overhead added has been measured in different 
scenarios in order to evaluate the system. For that purpose, the 
delay in milliseconds has been measured from the moment 
when Snort triggers the alert to the moment the SMA reports 
the extended alert. All the results have been executed with the 
same Snort configuration, which means, same rules and 
threshold configurations. 
C. Validation Test 
To validate the effectiveness of the usage of the SMA 
prototype in a 5G multi-tenant network, three key features have 
to be validated: first, to support multi-tenancy and 5G; second, 
self-adapt to any change which could occur in a network 
topology; and third to add an acceptable overhead, negligible 
for the whole system.  
The first and the second features together, make possible to 
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protect at the same time, infrastructure, tenants and 5G users in 
both edge and core network segments of the 5G multi-tenant 
infrastructure. This capability is mainly possible thanks to the 
innovations presented in this contribution to be able to 
accurately identify the attacking nodes within the 5G network, 
in contrast to traditional NIDS’s that only fit for traditional IP 
traffic. This capability has already been proved and discussed 
in this work, in Section III. An example of a 5G frame is 
depicted in the Wireshark capture shown in Fig. 5. That capture 
shows the headers of the encapsulation protocols, VxLAN and 
GTP. Also, the identifier of the tenant and the subscriber can be 
found in these headers respectively. Those identifiers are 
VNI=10332 and TEID=84D1. Both encapsulation layers and 
identifiers are crucial for accurate identification of the attacker 
node. Fig. 6 shows an extract of a Snort log with the alert 
triggered by the last packet where this information is clearly 
missing. In a later stage of this example, it has been depicted 
the output of the SMA for that same alert. This output, depicted 
in the SMA report of Listing 1, shows all the needed 
information to detect any flow of the 5G infrastructure thanks 
to the novel DPI Flow Classifier prototyped. This fact confirms 
the capability of the SMA to accurately identify the attacker 
node. 
For the third feature to be validated, different experiments have 
been addressed to measure the overhead of the SMA.  
The first group of experiments aimed to check the influence of 
various levels of encapsulations on the performance of the 
SMA. The more the levels of encapsulation, the greater is the 
size of the packet. The classifier module of the SMA extract 
information which is proportional to the number of layers of 
encapsulation applied to a flow. Fig. 11 shows the overhead 
introduced by the SMA when detecting attacks at various levels 
of encapsulations. In Fig. 11, presents attackers in a range of 2 
to 256 UEs. The greater the number of attackers there are, the 
more flows must be processed by the SMA. The number of 
alerts received by the SMA and therefore the number of packets 
to process also depends on the configuration of the IDS, which 
is Snort in this validation process. Listing 2 shows an extract of 
a Snort rules definition file with the rule used for the validation 
experiments. This rule with signature id (sid) 10000003, defines 
the signature of a packet of the launched attack. It matches a 
UDP flooding attack where the IP source is equal to the variable 
$EXTERNAL_NET (defined as “any” in the Snort 
configuration file), any source port, a destination IP address 
equals the variable $HOME_NET (defined with the IP address 
of the victim in the Snort configuration file), destination port 
4789 and a payload that contents “00000000”.  
 
To reduce the noise related to the number of logged alerts rules, 
Snort includes a rule thresholding feature. It allows limiting the 
number of times a particular event is logged during a specific 
time interval. The definition of the thresholding used for the 
Snort rule of Listing 2 is shown in Listing 3. This thresholding 
definition means that the threshold will be tracked by IP 
destination (distributed attack) and that this rule with sid 
10000003 logs every 500th event on this sid during one second. 
If less than 500 occur in 1 second, nothing gets logged. Once an 
event is logged, a new time period starts. That means that for an 
attack with a packet rate of 1000 packets per second, the NIDS 
logs approximately 2 events per second, which are then 
processed by the SMA. A higher or lower logging rate could be 
managed by varying the parameters of the threshold 
configuration file for this rule. However, the approach in these 
validation experiments has been to use different packet rate in 
the creation of the attack, as can be seen in the next section. 
Thus, in the previous example, to increase the periodicity of the 
events to approximately 4 events per second the packet rate 
should be of 2000 packets per second.  
 
In this experiment, all attackers are attacking the same victim. 
This experiment has been executed with four different PCAPs, 
each of them with a different encapsulation structure. The 
experiment has been executed for IP traffic, GTP over IP traffic, 
VXLAN over IP traffic and finally, VXLAN over GTP over IP 
traffic, which corresponds to the four parsing sequences 
depicted in Fig. 7 . The attack used for this experiment has 25 
Mbps of bandwidth and a payload of 400 bytes, which is a 
packet rate of 5875 packets per second. In Fig. 11, it is shown 
how the system adds an overhead of just 3 ms of difference in 
the worst-case scenario between all the different encapsulation 
scenarios. These 3 ms are added to 10 ms delay taken by Snort 
to report the attack with a very tiny difference among the 
different numbers of encapsulations.  
 
Fig. 11. Overhead introduced for a different number of attackers with different 
levels of encapsulations. 
 
These results show a very little overhead to be able to have the 
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 4789 
(msg:"Attempted DDOS UDP attack *00000000* message 
detected"; content:"|00 00 00 00|"; 
classtype:attempted-dos; sid:10000003; rev:001;) 
event_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 10000003, type 
threshold, track by_dst, count 500, seconds 1 
Listing 2. Example of the Snort rule defined to trigger alerts matching the 
launched attack of the experiments. 
Listing 3. Extract of the threshold. conf file with the configuration of 
threshold for the rule used in the experiments. 
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IDS detecting attacks in the edge of the network for 5G multi-
tenant infrastructures. It validates the effectiveness of the 
proposed solution.  
For a better understanding of all the subprocesses included in 
the entire use case, they are depicted in Fig. 12. The timeline 
shows every action point, and subprocess that happens since the 
attack is triggered until the SMA reports the event. The 
overhead measured in all the experiments presented in this 
section is the time invested by the SMA, which is the time 
lapsed from step 3 to step 6 shown in of Fig. 12.  
 
Fig. 12. Detached sub-processes of the use case. 
Fig. 13 shows the absolute times of the entire process for the 
detection of a DDoS Attack using a Multi-Tenant 5G Flow. In 
this case, the experiment has been repeated 5 times on each of 
the two different NIDS´s supported in our prototype: Snort and 
Suricata. The same rule and threshold configuration have been 
used for both NIDS´s, obtaining the same alerts processed by 
the SMA in unified2 format. Snort version 2.9.9.0 and Suricata 
version 3.2 have been used in this testbed. The processing times 
gathered for both NIDS´s is insignificant as depicted in Fig. 13, 
being Snort 0.5 milliseconds slower than Suricata for the worst 
case. This little better behaviour of Suricata could be due to the 
multithreading supported by this tool, being this study out of 
the scope of this work. The processing times regarding the SMA 
are not affected by the NIDS replacements.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Absolute times from attack sending time until SMA reporting time. 
The first blocks of the stacked bar represent the time that 
passes since the attack is sent until the NIDS detects and reports 
the attack. The second block represents the time that passes 
from that Snort detection until the SMA start to process it. The 
third block corresponds to the time that the SMA spends in 
processing the event, that is interpreting the Unified2 and 
mapping into the objects of the SMA data model. The fourth 
block is the time spent in the classification of the flow, 
extracting all the overlays information. Moreover, the last block 
is the time spent in building the JSON to be reported.  Notice 
that none of the results provided in this section has been 
compared with any other available research work, mainly 
because the functionality provided in this research work is, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first-of-its-kind to be published 
and thus there is not any other work to compare with.  
 
 
Fig. 14. Overhead introduced for a different number of attackers for different 
attack bandwidth. 
E. Attack Behaviour Test 
Fig. 15 shows the overhead introduced by the SMA for different 
packet rates. Two types of attacks shown in the figure: “one-to-
one” which means that each UE attacks to a different victim; 
and “all-to-one” which means that every UE attacks to the same 
victim. These experiments have been executed for 128 attackers 
and a fixed bandwidth of 50Mb, which is a realistic scenario for 
a current mobile broadband user.  
 
Fig. 15. Overhead introduced for different packet rates for the same number of 
attackers (128) and same bandwidth (50Mb). The results show two types of 
attack one-to-one (one UE attacks one victim) and all-to-one (every UE 
attacks to the same victim). 
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The payload size of the packets sent in the attacks has been 
ranged from the minimum possible (~0 bytes) to the maximum 
(1368 bytes). This payload range implies to have a packet rate 
ranged between 1466 packets per second (pps) and 47348pps 
for an attack of 50Mb of bandwidth. The higher is the packet 
rate, the more alerts will be triggered by the NIDS. 
Fig. 15 shows a very stable behaviour of the system on 
average, although the standard deviation tends to increase with 
the packet rates. Fig. 15 also shows that the overhead is greater 
on average for the attack type “one-to-one” than it is for the 
attack “all-to-one”. However, it is still below 70 ms for the 
worst case, where the attack is composed of packets with the 
minimum payload possible and a packet rate of 47348 pps. 
These set of results indicates that the proposed SMA is suitable 
to protect both edge and core network segment of the novel 5G 
multi-tenant infrastructures.  
Different experiments have been executed in order to test the 
scalability of the system and the performance against different 
levels of encapsulations. The scalability test has proved SMA 
can amicably handle the different scale of attacks regarding the 
number of attackers, the bandwidth of the attack and packet 
rates. For the overlying support pcaps with different 
encapsulations has been used. According to the results shown, 
it can be claimed that the SMA has successfully achieved the 
targets of tenant aware, topologically flexible and scalability 
with very acceptable overheads for detecting DDoS attacks in 
5G networks. The control messages sent by the SMA could be 
received in the control plane by a manager to take a proper 
decision to mitigate the attack on time, having all the 
information required to enforce such decision. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A novel system to efficiently protect against DDoS attacks in 
5G multi-tenant networks has been proposed, implemented, and 
empirically validated. The proposed system efficiently protects 
tenants, infrastructure, the provider of the infrastructure and 
final-users in the 5G network simultaneously. This proposed 
system can be allocated to almost all the 5G network segments 
which is a significant advantage for Mobile Edge Security. The 
system has been validated against UDP flooding DDoS attack 
as realistic use case where more than 256 simultaneous 
attackers are injecting malicious traffic at 100Mb/s to a 5G 
network. The proposed system is based on the extension of a 
well-known IDS called Snort, but the system is extensible and 
thus valid for any other IDS that report events in Unified2 
format. All the previous claims have been achieved without 
adding significant overhead to the system, which means that 
there are no significant delays in the reception of alerts 
comparing with the times provided by the IDS. It has been 
proved the scalability of the system, showing an almost 
constant behaviour even for the worst cases regarding the 
number of attackers or type of attack. 
Future work will investigate the usage of this framework in 
a mitigation system, to mitigate the attack in the proper place. 
This combination of detection and mitigation will help in the 
closing of the cognitive management loop envisioned for the 
novel 5G infrastructures.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This work was funded in part by the European Commission 
Horizon 2020 5G PPP Programme under grant agreement 
number H2020-ICT-2014-2/671672 – SELFNET (Self-
Organized Network Management in Virtualized and Software 
Defined Networks). This work is also supported by Zayed 
University Cluster Research Award #R18038. This work was 
additionally funded by the UWS 5G Video Lab project. 
REFERENCES 
[1] 5G PPP, “5G PPP use cases and performance evaluation models,” 
2016. 
[2] Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance, “NGMN 5G White 
Paper,” Ngmn, pp. 1–125, 2015. 
[3] G. Horn and P. Schneider, “Towards 5G security,” in Proceedings - 
14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy 
in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2015, 2015, vol. 1, 
pp. 1165–1170. 
[4] “NHS cyber-attack causing disruption one week after breach | 
Society | The Guardian.” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/may/19/nhs-cyber-
attack-ransomware-disruption-breach. [Accessed: 22-Dec-2017]. 
[5] BBC, “TalkTalk cyber-attack: Website hit by ‘significant’ breach - 
BBC News,” BBC News, 2015. 
[6] K. Lab, “GLOBAL IT SECURITY RISKS SURVEY Global IT 
Security Risks Survey 2015: The current state of play.” 
[7] Arbor Network, “Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report,” 2016. 
[Online]. Available: 
https://www.arbornetworks.com/images/documents/WISR2016_EN
_Web.pdf. [Accessed: 04-Dec-2017]. 
[8] “Major DDoS Attacks Involving IoT Devices,” European Union 
Agency for Network and Information, 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/major-ddos-
attacks-involving-iot-devices. 
[9] F. Wang, H. Wang, X. Wang, and J. Su, “A new multistage 
approach to detect subtle DDoS attacks,” Math. Comput. Model., 
vol. 55, pp. 198–213, 2012. 
[10] I. Ahmad, T. Kumar, M. Liyanage, J. Okwuibe, M. Ylianttila, and 
A. Gurtov, “5G security: Analysis of threats and solutions,” in 2017 
IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and 
Networking (CSCN), 2017, pp. 193–199. 
[11] Mahalingam M. et al., “Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network 
(VXLAN): A Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 
Networks over Layer 3 Networks,” Kenchiku Setsubi Iji Hozen 
Suishin Kyōkai, 2014. 
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